

**Submitted to
The United Nations Working Group on the use of mercenaries
to inform
the Working Group's report to be presented to the 80th Session of
the General Assembly in
November 2025**



Rights Defenders Initiative (RDI)
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Abbreviations in the text

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-Justice and Development Party
ASDER	Adaleti Savunanlar Derneği-The Association of Justice Defenders
ASRIKA	Project ASRIKA (Asia-Africa) Confederation of Islamic States
ASSAM	Adaleti Savunanlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Derneği-The Justice Defenders Association Strategic Research Center
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-Republican People's Party
GNA	Government of National Accord (Libya)
SADAT	SADAT International Defense Consultancy Construction Industry and Trade Inc.
HDP	Halkın Demokrasi Partisi- People's Democracy Party
IYI	İyi Parti -Good Party
MIT	Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı- The National Intelligence Organization
MP	Member of Parliament
PMC	Private Military Company
PMSC	Private Military and Security Company
RDI	Rights Defenders Initiative
TSK	Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri- The Turkish Armed Forces
TBMM	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi-The Grand National Assembly of Türkiye
ZP	Zafer Partisi-Victory Party

I. Introduction

1. [Rights Defenders Initiative \(RDI\)](#) submits the following report in response to the call for input by the United Nations Working Group on the use of mercenaries mandated to monitor and identify mercenaries and related activities to inform its thematic reports to be presented at the Human Rights Council in September 2025 and at the UN General Assembly in October/November 2025.
2. This report focuses on Turkish Private Military Company (PMC) SADAT International Defense Consultancy Construction Industry and Trade Inc. (SADAT) and its affiliates-mercenaries and related activities in all their forms and manifestations.
3. RDI is an unincorporated association based in London. It was established two years ago by a passionate group of volunteers who came together to advocate for human rights. Our mission is to raise global awareness towards human rights violations without taking ethnicity, race, or political views into consideration. We believe in the protection of every individual's fundamental rights.
4. International organizations, especially the UN, documented and reported SADAT's activities outside Türkiye.
5. However, there is less awareness of SADAT's and its affiliations' human rights violations inside Türkiye specifically regarding the so-called coup attempt on 15th of July, 2016 and its negative impact on the country's respect for constitutional order and its majority population, who are committed to democracy and secularism.
6. It is vital to pursue and take measures against the international crimes committed by SADAT and its affiliates-mercenaries, and it would also be in the interest of regional and global peace and security to

expose the crimes committed in Türkiye. SADAT and its affiliates-mercenaries operate under the auspices of and in favor of Turkish Government with minimal oversight, enabling them to commit these abuses with impunity¹ in Türkiye.

7. These conditions make it very difficult to bring SADAT's crimes into view as well as to take the necessary measures. RDI believes that all efforts to document SADAT's abuses and crimes should be supported in every way.

8. In this sense, the Sound of Silence Group-SoS published a very important report, "SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army,"² which sheds light on the period and exposes SADAT's unspoken human rights violations and alleged terrorist activities in Türkiye, emphasizing the potential implications for the country's constitutionally protected democratic form of government and its democratic secular population.

9. Some public officials turned SADAT and its affiliates-mercenaries' systematic crimes into a PR tool for the Turkish Government for fear and intimidation. This approach is unprecedented, as most states typically deny such practices.

10. In Türkiye's case, SADAT and its affiliates-mercenaries were openly encouraged and their works were displayed. In this regard, RDI provided concrete, conclusive, and sufficient evidence beyond any doubt of systemic abuse of the Prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (arts. 2, 7, 9, 10, 12, and 14)³ in Türkiye by detailed and precise information about the unofficial detention centers and victims' narratives about the systemic use of torture and ill-treatment via its report⁴ to the UN Human Rights Committee 142 Session which was held on 14 Oct 2024 - 07 Nov 2024 for the Türkiye Session. It showed that how the Anadolu Agency (AA)⁵, the state's official news agency, served torture images to the public. National media featured pictures of beaten soldiers for days after so-called coup attempt on 15th July, 2016. Turkish Government demonstrated power by bringing the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) to its knees through these publications. SADAT has been accused of playing a significant role in the events of 15 July 2016.^{6 7}

11. Additionally, with this report, RDI seeks to shed light on a proposed new union⁸ intended to operate beyond the "control of Western imperialism"⁹ and grounded in religious principles, namely the ASRIKA project, which has been interpreted as a potential threat to national, regional, and global security and stability.

12. This report also;

- a. seeks to contribute to the Working Group's call by providing an analysis of the activities of SADAT Inc. International Defense Consultancy (Turkish: Uluslararası Savunma Danışmanlık Şirketi),

¹ Armenian Bar Association, Armenian Bar Association Files Global Magnitsky Sanctions Complaint Against Turkey's SADAT, 23.09.2024, Armenian Bar Association, Accessed 24.12.2024

² Sound of Silence, SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army, August 2017, 15julynotes.com, Accessed 02.12.2024

³ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10.12.1984, General Assembly resolution 39/46, Accessed 02.02.2025

⁴ RDI, tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2FCCPR%2FCSS%2FTUR%2F59607&Lang=en, September 2024, RDI, Accessed 23.11.2024

⁵ Anadolu Ajansı-AA, Akın Öztürk ve darbeci generaller tutuklandı, 25.07.2016, AA, Accessed 11.04.2024

⁶ Sound of Silence, SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army, August 2017, 15julynotes.com, Accessed 02.12.2024

⁷ Beşire Korkmaz, Sadat hakkındaki iddiaların perde arkasında neler var?, 15.06.2021, Teyit, Accessed 16.09.2023

⁸ Oda Tv, SADAT'ın seçim planı, 19.11.2023, ODA TV, Accessed 05.01.2024

⁹ Dmitri Amirov Belova, Turquía, las PMC islamistas y la Zona gris, 12.02.2023, Revistaejercitos, Accessed 23.04.2024

- b. aims to provide concrete, conclusive and sufficient evidence beyond any doubt of instances, in which SADAT and its affiliates-mercenaries abuse its power, and precise information about how SADAT's activities impact human rights.

13. RDI believes that using multiple data sources ensures a balanced report approach, incorporating official and unofficial accounts of the events. So, it represents significant atrocities that demand attention from responsible organizations, especially the UN, as a sine qua non for preventing future occurrences.

14. In this report, RDI endeavors to address these crimes by offering insights into SADAT's unspoken human rights violations and alleged terrorist activities in Türkiye, emphasizing the potential implications for the country's constitutionally protected democratic form of government and its people who committed to democracy and secularism.

II. SADAT and Turkish Government

Overview

15. SADAT founded in 2012 by retired Brigadier General Adnan Tanrıverdi with the backing of 64 retired Turkish officers and 23 funding shareholders¹⁰, fulfilling a direct order from Erdoğan¹¹, operates as Türkiye's first and only private military company PMC, in collaboration with the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı-MIT).¹²

16. The organization's stated mission is to foster defense cooperation among Islamic countries, aiming to empower the Islamic world as a unified global power. These officers were carefully selected for their 'respect towards the religious sensitivities of Islamic countries'¹³. The company promptly commenced its operations after publishing its "articles of incorporation" in the "Turkish Trade Registry Gazette" in February 2012.

17. SADAT, as a private defense and strategic consulting company outside the "control of Western imperialism", which "favors enmity between Islamic countries" to take advantage and exploit such quarrels¹⁴, provides military consultancy, training, and logistical support, with additional activities including arms supply and the recruitment and deployment of mercenaries¹⁵. Its operations align closely with Türkiye's neo-Ottoman foreign policy objectives, enabling covert and strategic interventions in various regions.¹⁶

18. Contrary to the common perception of PMCs as entities driven primarily by financial gain, SADAT's leadership and operational strategies reflect an ideological alignment with Erdoğan's political pragmatism, religious extremism, and charismatic authority¹⁷ from its inception. Jonathan Spyer¹⁸ calls

¹⁰ Tomás Fonseca, [SADAT Defense Inc.: Turkey's PMC](#), 21.07. 2023, Grey Dynamics, Accessed 05.02.2025

¹¹ David Gaüzère, [Malhama Tactical et SADAT : Le Mercenariat Au Service de L'Islam Politique](#), January 2022, Cf2R Bulletin De Documentation N°26, Accessed 12.06.2023

¹² Dmitri Amirov Belova, [Turquía, las PMC islamistas y la Zona gris](#), 12.02.2023, Revistaejercitos, Accessed 23.04.2024

¹³ SADAT, [SADAT International Defense Consultancy Construction Industry and Trade Inc.](#) Accessed 05.02.2025

¹⁴ Dmitri Amirov Belova, [Turquía, las PMC islamistas y la Zona gris](#), 12.02.2023, Revistaejercitos, Accessed 23.04.2024

¹⁵ Armenian Bar Association, [Armenian Bar Association Files Global Magnitsky Sanctions Complaint Against Turkey's SADAT](#), 23.09.2024, Armenian Bar Association, Accessed 24.12.2024

¹⁶ Matt Powers, [Making Sense of SADAT, Türkiye's Private Military Company](#), 08.10.2021, War on the Rocks, Accessed 23.10.2024

¹⁷ Giorgi Koberidze, [Erdoğan and the Emergence of Erdoğanism in Turkish Politics](#), 25.11.2024, JPD Troy University, Accessed 23.01.2025

SADAT members “political soldiers,” likening the organization to the Iranian Pasdaran, loyal to a political regime, not the state (unlike the regular army).

19. The organization recruits vulnerable populations, including refugees and displaced individuals, often luring them with promises of high salaries and legal documentation. SADAT’s mercenaries, deployed across conflict zones, often lack adequate training and resources, resulting in high casualties and allegations of exploitation. Its operations are further animated by neo-Ottoman and extremist aspirations, seeking to create “manageable chaos” in neighboring regions to bolster Turkish influence¹⁹.



Figure 1 SADAT-ASSAM members visiting Erdoğan on February 21, 2011. Tanrıverdi is on Erdoğan's right.²⁰

Organizational Structure and Funding

20. SADAT is headed by the Tanrıverdi family, with Melih Tanrıverdi, son of the founder, serving as its CEO. The organization employs former Turkish military personnel and operates with standard Turkish military equipment²¹, which underscores its strong ties to the Turkish government.

21. Despite these connections, SADAT maintains a degree of operational autonomy, enabling it to act as a shadowy extension of Türkiye’s military apparatus.

¹⁸ Jonathan Spyer, [Erdoğan’s Shadow Army: The Influence of “Sadat,” Turkey’s Private Defense Group](#), 24.04.2018, JISS, Accessed 01.05.2024

¹⁹ Michael Rubin, [Has SADAT Become Erdoğan’s Revolutionary Guards?](#), 30.05.2017, American Enterprise Institute Accessed 01.01.2025

²⁰ Barış Terkoğlu, <https://haberduvari.net/erdogan-sadata-neden-sadat-diyor/> "Erdoğan SADAT’A neden ‘sâdât’ diyor," Haber Duvarı, Accessed 07.02.2025

²¹ Matt Powers, [Making Sense of SADAT, Türkiye’s Private Military Company](#), 08.10.2021, War on the Rocks, Accessed 23.10.2024

22. SADAT is funded through a combination of state resources, private contracts, and alleged involvement in illicit activities, such as arms trading and money laundering. Its opaque financial and operational structure complicates efforts to hold it accountable for its actions.²²

Key aspects of SADAT's connection to President Erdoğan

23. SADAT's connection to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party) is a significant point of contention, with various allegations and questions raised in written parliamentary questions and other sources.

24. SADAT's founder, Adnan Tanrıverdi, was a former military officer who was retired from the TSK due to his alleged²³ extremist views and later became a chief advisor to President Erdoğan.

Founding of SADAT

25. There are claims that SADAT was established with the order²⁴ of the Prime Minister at the time Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, allegedly to create a private army for him.

26. SADAT's activities extend beyond providing conventional military training and equipment, including recruiting, training, organizing, and deploying mercenaries in conflict zones. Some see SADAT's activities as driven by political and ideological motives (of President Erdoğan)²⁵. Some consider SADAT actually paramilitary force loyal to Erdoğan, and it has been seen by some as a new Turkish Gladio, managing operations inside and outside the country.²⁶

Tanrıverdi's Role

27. Adnan Tanrıverdi, well-known for his numerous connections with Islamist groups in Arab countries²⁷ and Salafist-Jihadist ideology, became a chief advisor to Erdoğan in August 2016. This assignment further fueled concerns about the relationship between SADAT and the government. Tanrıverdi resigned from his position as head of SADAT after becoming Erdoğan's advisor but remained on the board.

28. Tanrıverdi's influence extends to the restructuring of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), with claims that SADAT was able to enroll its affiliated candidates into the military and implement changes.

SADAT as a Paramilitary Force

29. SADAT has been accused of acting as a paramilitary force for Erdoğan, working outside of the official military and security apparatus. The combination of SADAT as an ideologized PMC abroad, civilian groups like the Gray Wolves, and proxy militias such as the Free Syrian Army and the private security company Ekol Group Security, Protection and Training Services Co., which operates both within Türkiye and regionally shows not only that Turkish Regime controls a paramilitary system outside the state but also that he has tools at his disposal for developing grey zones.²⁸

²² South World, [Turkish Islamic Private military company launches offensive in Africa](#), 01.09.2024, South World, Accessed 25.11.2024

²³ Tomás Fonseca, [SADAT Defense Inc.: Turkey's PMC](#), 21.07. 2023, Grey Dynamics, Accessed 05.02.2025

²⁴ David Gaüzère, [Malhama Tactical et SADAT : Le Mercenariat Au Service de L'islam Politique](#), January 2022, Cf2R Bulletin De Documentation N°26, Accessed 12.06.2023

²⁵ Editor Staff, [Turkish PMC SADAT Defense Inc on the Rise](#), 27.07.2023, SOFX, Accessed 13.08.2024

²⁶ Maxime Azadi, [Turkish assassination teams: The policy of criminalisation in Europe encouraged killings - PART 2](#), 05.03.2022, ANF, Accessed 11.11.2023

²⁷ Akram Kharief, [Diplomats, spies and arms dealers: Turkey's Great Game in North Africa](#), June 2022, RLS, Accessed 26.12.2023

30. It is alleged that SADAT has ties with mafia groups, and some of these groups were armed during the so-called 15 July coup attempt.²⁹

31. SADAT is alleged to have played a key role in the so-called 15 July coup attempt by mobilizing pro-government forces, which resulted in the loss of lives.

Lack of Transparency

32. The AKP government has been criticized for its lack of transparency regarding SADAT, with many parliamentary questions about the organization going unanswered. There are claims that the government deliberately avoids disclosing SADAT's legal or administrative scrutiny.

Written Parliamentary questions highlighting SADAT's connection to Erdoğan and the AKP

33. Member of Parliament (MP) Hüda Kaya (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi- People's Democracy Party-HDP) asked³⁰

- a. About the extent of cooperation between SADAT and various government bodies, including the TSK, National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and the police.
- b. Whether SADAT had the power to place its members into the military.

34. Alpay Antmen (MP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-Republican People's Party CHP) asked³¹

- a. If SADAT was providing services to public institutions for free, implying a possible quid pro quo relationship.
- b. About the nature of the collaboration between SADAT and the TSK, MİT, and the police, suggesting concerns about the influence of SADAT on state institutions.
- c. If there were any government employees who had been placed in their positions by SADAT, this highlights concerns about SADAT's influence on government.

35. Fikri Sağlar (MP- CHP) questioned³²

- a. The appointment of Adnan Tanrıverdi as Chief Consultant to Erdoğan, highlighting the close relationship between the two.
- b. Whether Adnan Tanrıverdi was in contact with the Chief of General Staff before the so-called 15 July 2016 coup attempt, indicates a concern about the nature of the communication and relationship between the two.

36. Mahmut Tanal (MP-CHP) asked³³

- a. If SADAT was acting in line with Turkish domestic and foreign policy, which suggests concerns that SADAT was not serving the interests of the state but rather the interests of the AKP.
- b. If the government was allowing for a parallel security force that was not under its control, raising concerns that SADAT was acting as a private army for the AKP rather than a security organization under government control.

37. These Written questions and other allegations suggest a strong and potentially problematic relationship between SADAT, Erdoğan, and the AKP. The lack of transparency and the government's reluctance to address these concerns have only fueled further speculation about SADAT's true purpose and influence.

²⁸ Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak and Dr. Jonathan Spyer, [Turkish Militias and Proxies](#), 27.01.2021, JISS, Accessed 08.08.2024

²⁹ Sound of Silence, [SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army](#), August 2017, [15julynotes.com](#), Accessed 02.12.2024

³⁰ Haber Merkezi, [HDP'li Hüda Kaya'ya SADAT cezası](#), 13.09.2023, Yeşil Gazete, Accessed 14.11.2024

³¹ Alpay Antmen, [TBMM Soru Önergesi-Written Parliamentary Question](#), 21.09.2018, Accessed 14.11.2024

³² Fikri Sağlar, [TBMM Soru Önergesi-Written Parliamentary Question](#), 19.08.2016, Accessed 14.11.2024

³³ Av Mahmut Tanal, [TBMM Soru Önergesi-Written Parliamentary Question](#), 19.08.2016, Accessed 14.11.2024

III. SADAT and its Affiliates' Human Rights Violations Records in Türkiye

SADAT and its Affiliates Human Rights Violations on the so-called 15 July 2016 coup attempt

Involvement in 15 July 2016

38. On 15th July 2016, there was a so-called coup attempt in Türkiye that forever changed everything for the Turkish people and Türkiye. RDI wholeheartedly condemns all kinds of unlawful attempts to overthrow democratically elected governments and believes that those who dared to do this deserve punishment. And, of course, the sentence must only come after a fair and just judicial process.

39. RDI filed a [report](#)³⁴ to the UN [Human Rights Committee 142 Session](#), which was held on 14 Oct 2024 - 07 Nov 2024 for the Türkiye Session. This report provided a comprehensive view of the situation, allowing for a thorough analysis of the torture allegations and human rights violations in Türkiye following the events of July 15, 2016.

40. SADAT has been accused of playing a significant role in the events of 15 July 2016.^{35 36 37}

41. On the anniversary of the so-called July 15th coup, Sound of Silence Group-SoS published a very important report, "[SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army](#) ", which sheds light on the period and exposes SADAT's unspoken human rights violations and alleged terrorist activities in Türkiye, emphasizing the potential implications for the country's constitutionally protected democratic form of government and its people who committed to democracy and secularism.

42. SADAT, in collaboration with MiT and the Police Forces loyal to Erdoğan, allegedly acted as a hub to mobilize and coordinate the activities of various pro-AKP militias and mafia gangs on the so-called 15 July³⁸ to aggravate the chaos and violence.

43. Some statements made by Nevzat Tarhan (Turkish military doctor, retired Colonel, psychiatrist, and neuropsychologist), a founder of SADAT, before and after the so-called 15 July coup attempt are noteworthy.³⁹ Tarhan stated that over a thousand officers and non-commissioned officers from the Association of Justice Defenders (ASDER), an organization formed by military personnel dismissed from the military due to their extremist views, took to the streets on the night of July 15th to clash with the coup plotters and performed tasks such as stopping tanks. These statements can be seen as significant clues regarding SADAT's organization and preparations before the so-called coup attempt.⁴⁰

44. This coordination aimed to counteract military dissent and suppress any opposition to Erdoğan's government, thus violating human rights.⁴¹

³⁴ Rights Defenders Initiative, tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2FCCPR%2FCSS%2FTUR%2F59607&Lang=en, September 2024, RDI, Accessed 23.11.2024

³⁵ Sound of Silence, [SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army](#) , August 2017, [15julynotes.com](#), Accessed 02.12.2024

³⁶ Beşire Korkmaz, [Sadat hakkındaki iddiaların perde arkasında neler var?](#) , 15.06.2021, Teyit, Accessed 16.09.2023

³⁷ South World, [Turkish Islamic Private military company launches offensive in Africa](#), 01.09.2024, South World, Accessed 25.11.2024

³⁸ Sound of Silence, [SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army](#) , August 2017, [15julynotes.com](#), Accessed 02.12.2024

³⁹ Beşire Korkmaz, [Sadat hakkındaki iddiaların perde arkasında neler var?](#) , 15.06.2021, Teyit, Accessed 16.09.2023

⁴⁰ Editorial, [ASDER Genel Başkan Tarhan liderliğinde darbe girişimini ve sonrasında yaşananları değerlendirdi](#), 23.07.2016, nevzattarhan.com, Accessed 09.01.2025

⁴¹ Sound of Silence, [SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army](#) , August 2017, [15julynotes.com](#), Accessed 02.12.2024

45. SADAT's twin organization, ASDER, whose members are the same people as those who founded SADAT, is alleged to have executed a pre-planned 'Coups Prevention Plan' on July 15, 2016 and has stated that an 'Offensive Intervention Plan' is ready if needed in the future.⁴²

46. It is also alleged that it works with civilians to take over military units.⁴³

47. According to Ümit Özdağ, who has been in detention since January 21, 2025, the leader of Victory Party (Zafer Partisi-ZP), Adnan Tanrıverdi stated that they had worked with civilians to prepare for the seizure of military units before the so-called coup attempt.⁴⁴ Tanrıverdi also admitted that he organized the blocking of military barracks' gates with buses and trucks on July 15th⁴⁵, and that they also had plans for stopping armored units.⁴⁶

Arming of civilians and mafia groups

48. Pro-AKP militias and mafia gangs controlled by SADAT such as Osmanlı Ocakları (Ottoman Hearths)⁴⁷ were allegedly armed by the Police Headquarters in Ankara.⁴⁸ These groups were present on the streets during the so-called coup attempt and played a critical role with brutal crimes during the events of the 15th July.⁴⁹

49. Radio communication transcripts⁵⁰ from the Ankara Provincial Security Directorate on the night of July 15-16, 2016, reveal that ammunition (*including weapons*) was distributed to civilians without proper police ID. The transcript indicates that reinforcements with ammunition were being distributed in front of Ankara Provincial Security Directorate. Despite warnings, the distribution continued without individuals showing police IDs. According to the radio communication, most of the ammunition ended up going to civilians. The actions of these armed groups have not been properly investigated or accounted for, raising further concerns about the role of SADAT and its affiliates.⁵¹

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Halk Tv, Ümit Özdağ'dan SADAT açıklaması! SADAT 15 Temmuz'a hazırlıklı mıydı?, 26.05.2022, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fc7S33wiF1g>, Halk Tv, Accessed 12.01.2025

⁴⁴ Moon Star TV, Korkunç 15 Temmuz itirafı: Ben yaptım... SADAT TSK'ya tuzak kurmuş... ABD bu sırrı 6 yıldır biliyor. 26.05.2022, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CpZcJKPiQ9Q>, Moon Star TV, Accessed 12.01.2025

⁴⁵ Halk Tv, Ümit Özdağ'dan SADAT açıklaması! SADAT 15 Temmuz'a hazırlıklı mıydı?, 26.05.2022, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fc7S33wiF1g>, Halk Tv, Accessed 12.01.2025

⁴⁶ Moon Star TV, Korkunç 15 Temmuz itirafı: Ben yaptım... SADAT TSK'ya tuzak kurmuş... ABD bu sırrı 6 yıldır biliyor. 26.05.2022, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CpZcJKPiQ9Q>, Moon Star TV, Accessed 12.01.2025

⁴⁷ KRT TV, Sedat Peker'in gündeme getirdiği '15 Temmuz'da silah dağıtıldı' iddiası Meclis'e taşındı, 14.07.2021, KRT TV, Accessed 25.01.2025

⁴⁸ Sound of Silence, SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army, August 2017, 15julynotes.com, Accessed 02.12.2024

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ankara Provincial Security Directorate's document dated 15.08.2016, numbered 58604142-6807.(91237).220 and titled "Radio Recordings" was taken from the reasoned decision file of the 17th High Criminal Court's commonly known as "Roof Case" numbered 2017/109Esas and 2019/30 Karar.

⁵¹ Sound of Silence, SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army, August 2017, 15julynotes.com, Accessed 02.12.2024

Saat 04:42:59	
2918-	Merkez
Merkez-	Dinlemede.
2918-	Merkez bu İl 11 önünde takviye olarak gelen mühimmatı kimlik göstermeden dağıtıyorlar, orada vatandaşlarda alıyor, bu konuda bir uyaralım biz gerekli ikazı yaptık ama yine de dağıtıma devam ediyorlar, vatandaşta alıyor oradan verilen mühimattan.
Merkez-	Anlaşıldı il 11'de bulunan personelimiz mühimmat dağıtımını, mühimmat dağıtımını durduralım efendim durduralım. Kimlik göstermeden, kimlik göstermeden personel kimliğini göstermeden kesinlikle mühimmat dağıtımı yapmayalım tamam.
2680-	Merkez anons eden istasyon doğru söylüyor. 2-3 şahıs da biz aradan çıkardık mühimmatların çoğu sivilere gidiyor tamam.

Figure 2: Ankara Provincial Security Directorate's document dated 15.08.2016, numbered 58604142-6807.(91237).220 and titled "Radio Recordings"

50. Concerning the arming of civilians and mafia groups like SADAT and Ottoman Ocakları in an organized way⁵²,
- Ankara Chief of Police Mahmut Karaaslan ordered weapon warehouses to be opened to distribute weapons to personnel to resist the so-called coup. However, **the distribution was held** without written records. After suppressing the so-called coup attempt, the count showed one MP-5 gun missing. The Ankara Governorship and Ankara Provincial Security Directorate announced on their websites that **weapons were not distributed to civilians**.⁵³ However, suspect Mustafa Maraş stated he obtained the MP-5 he used in a murder from a truck distributing weapons in front of the Ankara Provincial Security Directorate during the so-called July 15 coup attempt.⁵⁴
 - Claims of missing weapons after July 15th, according to [Müyesser Yıldız](#)⁵⁵, also include the Ankara Provincial Security Directorate having 15 missing weapons, 11 of which were Kalashnikovs, alongside hundreds of thousands of missing or damaged ammunition.
 - HDP Deputy Group Chairpersons Meral Daniş Beştaş and Saruhan Oluç demanded a parliamentary inquiry⁵⁶ to investigate the fate of weapons allegedly missing or out of inventory and distributed to civilian citizens after the so-called July 15 coup attempt. HDP's research motion submitted to the Presidency of the TBMM on the issue showed that the situation is much worse. According to HDP, after the so-called coup attempt, the number of missing weapons increased 7.5 times. Allegedly, a case of Kalashnikovs was transported to Istanbul and delivered to Osman Tomakin, an aide to the head of the Ak Parti Istanbul Youth Branch⁵⁷.

⁵² HDP, [15 Temmuz darbe girişimi sonrası dağıtıldığı iddia edilen silahların akıbetine ilişkin önergemiz | Halkların Demokratik Partisi](#), 13.07.2021, HDP, Accessed 23.04.2024

⁵³ [T.C. Ankara Valiliği - "Emniyet Silahıyla Cinayet" Başlıklı Habere İlişkin Basın Açıklaması](#), Accessed 23.04.2024

⁵⁴ Mesut Hasan BENLİ, ["Silahı o gece polisten aldım"](#), 08.06.2017, Hürriyet, Accessed 23.04.2024

⁵⁵ Müyesser Yıldız, [15 Temmuz'un Kayıp Silahları Konusunda Kritik Gelişme - Müyesser Yıldız](#), 19.01.2021, Accessed 23.04.2024

⁵⁶ HDP, [15 Temmuz darbe girişimi sonrası dağıtıldığı iddia edilen silahların akıbetine ilişkin önergemiz | Halkların Demokratik Partisi](#), 13.07.2021, HDP, Accessed 23.04.2024

⁵⁷ Ibid.

51. Selim Temurci, the former AKP Istanbul Provincial Head, confirmed that weapons were distributed to AKP organizations on the night of July 15th.^{58 59} He stated that these operations occurred without his knowledge, implying the distribution was done covertly.^{60 61}



Figure 3. Top left, AKP parliamentary candidate Altınok on the campaign trail. Top right, Altınok with Erdoğan and his wife Emine Erdoğan. Bottom left, Altınok with members of the mafia carrying automatic weapons during the events of July 15. Bottom right, with a police officer during the events.⁶²

Involvement in civilian killings: Using snipers and lynching of cadets and soldiers

52. SADAT, along with other pro-AKP paramilitary and mafia groups, is accused of contributing to the violence and chaos during the events of July 15, 2016, by killing civilians and brutally slaughtering surrendered conscript soldiers and military cadets. Specifically, SADAT is accused of using snipers to

⁵⁸ Okan İŞBECER, [SADAT, 15 Temmuz'da ne yaptı?](#), 26.05.2022, Türk Solu, Accessed 26.01.2025

⁵⁹ Haber Merkezi, [Sedat Peker'in 'silah dağıtıldı' iddiasını doğruladı: Maalesef üzümlere ifade ediyorum](#), 25.05.2022, SOL, Accessed 26.01.2025

⁶⁰ Okan İŞBECER, [SADAT, 15 Temmuz'da ne yaptı?](#), 26.05.2022, Türk Solu, Accessed 26.01.2025

⁶¹ Haber Merkezi, [Sedat Peker'in 'silah dağıtıldı' iddiasını doğruladı: Maalesef üzümlere ifade ediyorum](#), 25.05.2022, SOL, Accessed 26.01.2025

⁶² Sound of Silence, [SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army](#), August 2017, [15julynotes.com](#), Accessed 02.12.2024

target civilians and participating in the lynching of surrendered soldiers and cadets on the Bosphorus Bridge⁶³, where victims were allegedly stabbed, strangled, and beheaded.

53. These actions purportedly occurred in front of police officers who did not effectively intervene, and no criminal investigations were initiated.⁶⁴ These accusations are part of a larger claim that Erdoğan orchestrated a "self-coup" to consolidate power, using these murders as a pretext for a crackdown on political opponents.

Written Parliamentary Questions

54. Several written parliamentary questions were submitted to the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) regarding SADAT's activities and role in the 15 July so-called coup attempt.

55. Hüda Kaya (MP-HDP) submitted a written parliamentary question asking⁶⁵

- a. whether any public institutions were cooperating with SADAT and if the TSK, MİT, and the General Directorate of Security were working with SADAT.
- b. whether individuals involved in SADAT's activities were involved in the deaths of soldiers and military students on the Bosphorus bridge during the so-called 15 July coup attempt.
- c. about SADAT's alleged role at the Kabul airport in Afghanistan.
- d. about the identity of groups with "Esedullah" and "Cundullah" vests seen during a visit to Silvan in 2015, suggesting they could be SADAT members who were attacking the group including Kaya.

56. Alpay Antmen (MP-CHP) submitted a written parliamentary question asking⁶⁶

- a. about the criteria for evaluating candidates at military schools and whether these criteria were altered after the so-called coup attempt with the influence of Adnan Tanrıverdi.
- b. whether SADAT was providing services to public institutions for free and whether there was an official contract in place.
- c. whether TSK, MIT and the police were collaborating with SADAT and if so, what were the content and aims of these collaborations.
- d. if SADAT had training camps inside the country and who was overseeing them.
- e. which members of SADAT were employed or assigned to official posts in the government.

57. Fikri Sağlar (MP-CHP) submitted a written parliamentary question⁶⁷ regarding the appointment of SADAT's founder, Adnan Tanrıverdi, as Chief Consultant to the President and what kind of a relationship Tanrıverdi had with the Chief of General Staff before the so-called 15 July coup attempt. MP Sağlar asked

- a. if Tanrıverdi was in contact with the Chief of General Staff General Plans and Principles Directorate Salih Ulusoy before the so-called coup attempt.
- b. why his own previous parliamentary questions about SADAT were not answered by the Prime Minister.

58. Mahmut Tanal (MP-CHP) asked in his written parliamentary question⁶⁸

- a. whether the claims about SADAT being involved in activities against the Turkish Armed Forces were true.
- b. if SADAT was providing military training to any group and if these claims were being investigated.
- c. if SADAT's website was being used to promote military training and whether this was legal.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Haber Merkezi, [HDP'li Hüda Kaya'ya SADAT cezası](#), 13.09.2023, Yeşil Gazete, Accessed 14.11.2024

⁶⁶ Alpay Antmen, [TBMM Soru Önergesi-Written Parliamentary Question](#), 21.09.2018, Accessed 14.11.2024

⁶⁷ Fikri Sağlar, [TBMM Soru Önergesi-Written Parliamentary Question](#), 19.08.2016, Accessed 14.11.2024

⁶⁸ Av Mahmut Tanal, [TBMM Soru Önergesi-Written Parliamentary Question](#), 19.08.2016, Accessed 14.11.2024

- d. if the government was allowing for a parallel security force that was not under its control.
- e. if SADAT was acting in line with Turkish domestic and foreign policy.

59. These written questions highlight concerns about SADAT's role during and after the so-called 15 July coup attempt, its relationship with the government, and its alleged activities. However, the majority of these parliamentary questions have not been answered or have been given inadequate responses by the government.

After 15 July 2016: Obstruction of Justice

60. Following the events of 15 July, the head of SADAT, Adnan Tanrıverdi, was appointed as Chief Advisor to Erdoğan⁶⁹ and this appointment was seen as a reward for SADAT's role in suppressing the so-called coup attempt and is a testament to SADAT's importance to Erdoğan and the AKP.

61. Tanrıverdi's appointment allowed him to influence Turkish military restructuring and personnel policies. Tanrıverdi stated that many of the constitutional changes about the TSK they proposed were implemented after the so-called 15 July 2016 coup attempt.⁷⁰

62. To the Sound of Silence Group's report "SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army"⁷¹, SADAT's influence led to the Turkish Military's drift towards a Salafist-Jihadist ideology. SADAT is said to be behind the new recruitment policies in the Turkish military, which is now allowing "SADAT affiliated candidates" to join. It is alleged that groups linked to SADAT have been involved in intimidating and insulting lawyers and families of those accused of involvement in the so-called coup attempt during the ongoing 15 July trials.

63. Most importantly, these accusations highlight the role of SADAT as a key actor in the human rights violations that occurred during and after the 15 July 2016 events, often acting outside of the legal and democratic checks and balances.⁷² The pro-Erdoğan prosecutors and courts are accused of deliberately failing to investigate the killings, suggesting a cover-up of SADAT's.

64. In summary, SADAT is accused of a wide range of activities, from supporting terrorist groups through training and logistics to having a central role in the violence and human rights abuses during and after the 15 July 2016 events.^{73 74}

Islamic Union States: ASRIKA?

65. Adnan Tanrıverdi attended the 3rd International ASSAM Islamic Union Congress⁷⁵ which was organized in cooperation with the Union of Islamic World NGOs (IDSB), the Justice Defenders Association Strategic Research Center (ASSAM), and Üsküdar University, under the theme "ASRIKA Joint Defense Industry Production"⁷⁶.

66. In his statement, Tanrıverdi said, "The Mahdi (Erdoğan himself)⁷⁷ will come. We need to prepare the environment accordingly." He added, "Will there be an Islamic Union or not? How will it happen when

⁶⁹ Fikri Sağlar, [TBMM Soru Önergesi-Written Parliamentary Question](#), 19.08.2016, Accessed 14.11.2024

⁷⁰ Halk Tv, [SADAT, FETÖ'den daha tehlikeli... Perde arkasındaki ortakları kimler?](#), 16.05.2022, Halk Tv, Accessed 02.09.2023

⁷¹ Sound of Silence, [SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army](#), August 2017, [15julynotes.com](#), Accessed 02.12.2024

⁷² Beşire Korkmaz, [Sadat hakkındaki iddiaların perde arkasında neler var?](#), 15.06.2021, Teyit, Accessed 16.09.2023

⁷³ Sound of Silence, [SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army](#), August 2017, [15julynotes.com](#), Accessed 02.12.2024

⁷⁴ Beşire Korkmaz, [Sadat hakkındaki iddiaların perde arkasında neler var?](#), 15.06.2021, Teyit, Accessed 16.09.2023

⁷⁵ The 3rd International ASSAM Islamic Union Congress was held at the Istanbul Pullman Hotel on December 19-20, 2019.

⁷⁶ IDSB, [The 3rd International Islamic Union Congress was held in Istanbul](#), the Union of Islamic World NGOs (IDSB), Accessed 05.02.2025

the Mahdi comes? And when will the Mahdi come? God knows. Well, don't we have a responsibility? Shouldn't we prepare the environment? This is what ASSAM is doing."⁷⁸ After this statement made headlines and sparked huge protests in the country, Tanrıverdi resigned.⁷⁹

67. As part of the preparations for the coming Mahdi, SADAT, along with its associated think tank, ASSAM, actively conducts congresses to develop model infrastructures and regulations for a union, namely ASRIKA (Asia-Africa) Confederation of Islamic States emphasizing defense, justice, and economic systems, which envisions the unification of Islamic countries under a confederative structure.

68. The proposed union of 61 Islamic countries spanning Asia, Africa, Europe, and South America, organized into nine regional federations⁸⁰ and is expected as the "Islamic Union States," closely linked to SADAT and Erdoğan's government. These countries would function without changing national borders in their respective federations.⁸¹ The union will be governed by Sharia Law⁸², as stated in its proposed constitution.⁸³ Istanbul⁸⁴ is planned as its capital and Arabic is offered as the official language.⁸⁵ There is a proposal for a common currency called the ASRIKA Dinar.⁸⁶

⁷⁷ South World, [Turkish Islamic Private military company launches offensive in Africa](#), 01.09.2024, South World, Accessed 25.11.2024

⁷⁸ Birgün, [Erdoğan'ın başkanışmanı: Mehdi gelecek, ortamı hazırlıyoruz](#), 30.12.2019, Birgün, Accessed 18.10.2024

⁷⁹ Duvar Editör, [Close advisor to Erdoğan, who said 'Mahdi will come,' resigns](#), 09.01.2020, Duvar English, Accessed 09.09.2021

Adnan Tanrıverdi, a close advisor to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and member of the Presidency's Security and Foreign Policy Committee, has resigned from his post. "Due to my old age and the smear campaigns that have been gaining momentum, I have requested to be laid off from my post," Tanrıverdi said in a message he sent to colleagues, as reported by the outlet OdaTV.

⁸⁰ The nine federations include:

1. Federation of Islamic States of the Middle East [Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Yemen, Oman, Bahrein, Qatar, Kuwait, Palestine].
2. Federation of Islamic States of Central Asia [Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus].
3. Federation of Islamic States of the Middle East [Iran, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan].
4. Federation of Islamic States of South-East Asia [Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Maldives].
5. Federation of Islamic States of North Africa [Algeria, Egypt, Tunis, Libya, Morocco, Chad].
6. Federation of Islamic States of East Africa (or Red Sea Basin) [Sudan, Eritrea, Somali, Djibouti, Mozambique, Comoro Islands].
7. Federation of Islamic States of North-East Africa and South America [Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Surinam].
8. Federation of Islamic States of Southwest [Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Tog].
9. Federation of Islamic States of Europe [Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia].

⁸¹ Arestakes Simavoryan, [ASRIKA - The Idea of an Islamic Confederation](#), 10.02.2021, Orbelli Center, Accessed 14.08.2023

⁸² ODA Tv, [SADAT'ın seçim planı](#), 19.11.2023, ODA Tv, Accessed 05.01.2024


⁸³ ASRIKA's constitution will address key areas such as justice, defense, military issues, and domestic and foreign affairs. Regionally, the focus will include trade, transportation, economy, science and technology, culture, and tourism. The project envisions a parliament and ministries within the confederation. Additionally, it formalizes Zakat (charity) as a state-controlled fund. The ASRIKA project also includes the establishment of a customs union, a common market, a monetary union, and trades among member countries.

⁸⁴ ODA Tv, [SADAT'ın seçim planı](#), 19.11.2023, ODA Tv, Accessed 05.01.2024

⁸⁵ Arestakes Simavoryan, [ASRIKA - The Idea of an Islamic Confederation](#), 10.02.2021, Orbelli Center, Accessed 14.08.2023

⁸⁶ ODA Tv, [SADAT'ın seçim planı](#), 19.11.2023, ODA Tv, Accessed 05.01.2024

69. A crucial aspect of ASRIKA, there are indications that SADAT is attempting to establish the ASRIKA army, a joint military force⁸⁷, through military-industrial cooperation with Islamic nations.⁸⁸



Map 1. Model ASRIKA Geography of the Confederation of Islamic Countries.⁸⁹

70. While the ASRIKA Project is officially portrayed as a framework for cooperation among Islamic nations, its ties to SADAT and the broader political context of Erdoğanism⁹⁰ have raised concerns about potential connections to Turkish government ideologies.

71. Organizations like SADAT and ASSAM view the West with suspicion concerning its impact on the Islamic world. According to SADAT's official document⁹¹ released in 2024, the Islamic world is regarded as the arena for an undeclared, covert 'Third World War.' Western powers purportedly instigate conflicts through various means. The document asserts that, due to a loss of unity following the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Muslim countries have become 'easy targets' for global powers. The United States, the European Union, England, France, Russia, and China are accused of seeking to control Islamic territories by utilizing 'terrorist organizations they manipulate' and 'asymmetric warfare strategies' to establish authority through proxy wars.

⁸⁷ The plan includes a Defense Ministry, General Staff, and defense functions in nine regional federations to coordinate member states' armies. Plans also include establishing military production, research centers, and a collaborative foundation for advancements in space. The Confederation's General Staff issue orders for joint land, sea, air, missile defense, cyber and electronic security operations.

⁸⁸ Arestakes Simavoryan, [ASRIKA - The Idea of an Islamic Confederation](#), 10.02.2021, Orbelli Center, Accessed 14.08.2023

⁸⁹ ASSAM, ASRIKA İslam Birliği Modeli Krizlere Çözüm Arayışı Uluslararası Kongre Serisi https://assamcongress.com/download/2024_ASSAM_KONGRE_BEYANNAMESI-TR.pdf, 2024, ASSAM, Accessed 19.02.2025

⁹⁰ Giorgi Koberidze, [Erdoğan and the Emergence of Erdoğanism in Turkish Politics](#), 25.11.2024, JPD Troy University, Accessed 23.01.2025

⁹¹ ASSAM, ASRIKA İslam Birliği Modeli Krizlere Çözüm Arayışı Uluslararası Kongre Serisi https://assamcongress.com/download/2024_ASSAM_KONGRE_BEYANNAMESI-TR.pdf, 2024, ASSAM, Accessed 19.02.2025

72. The SADAT's viewpoint suggests a potentially detrimental impact on global security, with Western imperialism (crusader attitude) resulting in great chaos, suffering, and the displacement of millions of Muslims. So, SADAT's flagship project, ASRIKA is based on the belief that existing global alliances have failed to bring peace to the Islamic world, creating a need for a new union⁹² that should be outside the control of Western imperialism, which favors enmity between Islamic countries.⁹³

73. In this regard, the ASRIKA project aims to establish a unified Islamic bloc, which could negatively impact the security and stability of the Muslim world as well as regional and international dynamics. Initiatives like ASRIKA that exploit the opportunities presented by gray zones carry risks, including radicalization,⁹⁴ and must be carefully evaluated for their potential negative effects on human rights and individuals' rights to self-determination.

IV. SADAT International Defense Consultancy Construction Industry and Trade Inc.

Background: Modes of involvement of SADAT as proxies, enablers, and facilitators

Proxy Warfare and Conflict Zones

74. Türkiye, a member of NATO, effectively had a jihadi proxy force deployed in its Syrian homeland as well as in faraway war theaters like Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh.⁹⁵

75. SADAT operates in numerous conflict zones, including Libya, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Sahel region, serving as a proxy and enabler for Türkiye as a tool to advance foreign policy objectives under the guise of private operations.

76. By recruiting, training, and deploying mercenaries, the organization supports both state and non-state actors aligned with Turkish interests.

77. As Türkiye's neo-Ottoman ambitions pushed the country into Libya's civil war, SADAT deployed 3,500 and 3,800 paid Syrian fighters⁹⁶ to support the Government of National Accord (GNA), with mercenaries implicated in widespread war crimes and human rights abuses, including recruitment of children, severe restrictions on women's rights in areas controlled by some of the groups, and extrajudicial killings.⁹⁷

78. Similar operations in Nagorno-Karabakh involved the deployment of Syrian mercenaries used as 'cannon fodder'⁹⁸ to support Azerbaijan. Reports detail these fighters' involvement in targeting civilians, looting properties, and committing other acts that violate international law.⁹⁹

⁹² ODA Tv, [SADAT'ın seçim planı](#), 19.11.2023, ODA Tv, Accessed 05.01.2024

⁹³ Dmitri Amirov Belova, [Turquía, las PMC islamistas y la Zona gris](#), 12.02.2023, Revistaejercitos, Accessed 23.04.2024

⁹⁴ Dmitri Amirov Belova, [Turquía, las PMC islamistas y la Zona gris](#), 12.02.2023, Revistaejercitos, Accessed 23.04.2024

⁹⁵ Burak Bekdil, [Jihadis Are Becoming Turkey's Permanent Proxy Force](#), 31.03.2021, BESA, Accessed 01.01.2025

⁹⁶ Isabell Debre, [Pentagon report: Turkey sent up to 3,800 fighters to Libya](#), 18.07.2020, AP, Accessed 02.02.2025

⁹⁷ The Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination; the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; the Special Rapporteur on the sale and sexual exploitation of children, including child prostitution, child pornography and other child sexual abuse material and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, [The UN Joint Communication on the deployment of Syrian fighters to the armed conflict in Libya](#), 20.06.2020, Accessed 21.01.2025

⁹⁸ Ed Butler, [The Syrian mercenaries used as 'cannon fodder' in Nagorno-Karabakh](#), 10.12. 2020, BBC, Accessed 05.02.2025

⁹⁹ Liz Cookman, [Syrians Make Up Türkiye's Proxy Army in Nagorno-Karabakh](#), 05.10.2020, Foreign Policy, Accessed 15.07.2021

79. In Syria, SADAT plays a pivotal role in training and coordinating Turkish-backed militias. These groups have been accused of engaging in extremist activities, including supporting jihadist factions, which aligns with Türkiye's broader foreign policy ambitions.¹⁰⁰

80. "The main problem with these forces is their criminality," said Elizabeth Tsurkov, a fellow at the U.S.-based Foreign Policy Research Institute who has interviewed dozens of the fighters and said they appear to be driven by a desire for power and money rather than by any specific ideology.¹⁰¹

81. SADAT's operations in Africa, particularly in countries like Libya, Niger, and Mali, focus on safeguarding Turkish economic interests while collaborating with local factions and governments. This engagement contributes to the militarization of already unstable regions.¹⁰²

Covert Operations and Illicit Networks

82. SADAT facilitates covert operations, often working closely with MIT. Its activities include recruiting and training mercenaries, arms transfers, and providing logistical support to factions in conflict zones.

83. Reports also indicate that SADAT recruits minor and exploits vulnerable populations, further raising concerns about its ethical and legal practices.¹⁰³

84. SADAT has also been accused of facilitating illicit arms transfers to non-state actors and using Turkish military planes for the covert transportation of fighters and equipment.¹⁰⁴ Reports suggest that SADAT profits from commissions for each deployed fighter and engages in disinformation campaigns to obscure its involvement in illegal activities.¹⁰⁵

Training and Arming Terrorist Groups

85. Allegations suggest that SADAT collaborates with extremist groups, including al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, such as al-Nusra¹⁰⁶ and Hamas while facilitating the illicit transfer of weapons and funds.¹⁰⁷

86. SADAT is accused of providing weapons, military training, and counter-guerrilla training to terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Nusra in Syria.¹⁰⁸ These activities allegedly took place in three training camps in Türkiye and Syria¹⁰⁹ in which SADAT collaborated with ISIS and al-Nusra.

¹⁰⁰ Nicolas Bourcier, Frédéric Bobin and Morgane Le Cam, [Sadat, the 'Turkish Wagner' whose shadow hangs over West Africa](#), 07.06.2024, Le Monde, Accessed 16.01.2025

¹⁰¹ Sarah El Deeb and Joseph Krauss, [Money, hatred for the Kurds drives Turkey's Syrian fighters](#), 15.10.2019, AP, Accessed 14.11.2022

¹⁰² ADF, [Turkish PMC 'Sadat' Competes for Sahel Influence](#), 30.07.2024, ADF, Accessed 03.08.2024

¹⁰³ Michael Rubin, [Has SADAT Become Erdogan's Revolutionary Guards?](#), 30.05.2017, American Enterprise Institute, Accessed 01.01.2025

¹⁰⁴ The Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination; the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; the Special Rapporteur on the sale and sexual exploitation of children, including child prostitution, child pornography and other child sexual abuse material and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, [The UN Joint Communication on the deployment of Syrian fighters to the armed conflict in Libya](#), 20.06.2020, Accessed 21.01.2025

¹⁰⁵ Armenian Bar Association, [Armenian Bar Association Files Global Magnitsky Sanctions Complaint Against Turkey's SADAT](#), 23.09.2024, Armenian Bar Association, Accessed 24.12.2024

¹⁰⁶ Sound of Silence, [SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army](#), August 2017, [15julynotes.com](#), Accessed 02.12.2024

¹⁰⁷ EGE, [SADAT, outil d'influence islamique frériste dans une logique offensive turque](#), 29.01.2024, Ecole de Guerre Economique, Accessed 05.02.2024

¹⁰⁸ Sound of Silence, [SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army](#), August 2017, [15julynotes.com](#), Accessed 02.12.2024

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.



Figure 4. Aydınlik Newspaper dated September 03, 2012 states that SADAT provides training to opposition groups in Syria.¹¹⁰

87. SADAT is said to have trained foreign fighters from Central Asia and Europe, then transported them to Syria to fight for these groups.¹¹¹

88. These activities allegedly included training in ambush, raids, kidnapping, assassination, sabotage, guerrilla tactics, street movements, and secret operations.¹¹² There are also concerns¹¹³ about the training provided by SADAT in unconventional warfare.¹¹⁴ SADAT is training personnel in "nizami and gayri nizami" (regular and irregular) warfare as well as special operations¹¹⁵. SADAT also offers training packages for land, air, and sea operations, along with other police training programs.¹¹⁶ It employs former military personnel with extensive expertise in their respective fields.¹¹⁷

89. The Russian government has claimed that 25% of the foreign fighters who went to Syria from Russia had connections with SADAT.¹¹⁸

90. SADAT is accused of facilitating the transit of foreign fighters to combat zones and funneling illegal military aid to these groups.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁰ Uyanık Türkler Kulübü, [BAKANLIK ONAYLI GLADIO KONTRGERİLLA MERKEZİ!](#), 05.09. 2012, Accessed 08.12.2021

¹¹¹ Sound of Silence, [SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army](#), August 2017, [15julynotes.com](#), Accessed 02.12.2024

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Oda Tv, [SADAT'ın seçim planı](#), 19.11.2023, ODA TV, Accessed 05.01.2024

¹¹⁴ Arestakes Simavoryan, [ASRIKA - The Idea of an Islamic Confederation](#), 10.02.2021, Orbelli Center, Accessed 14.08.2023

¹¹⁵ Halk Tv, [SADAT'IN DÜŞÜNCE PROJESİ "ASRIKA"](#), 16.05.2022, Halk Tv, Accessed 27.02.2024

¹¹⁶ SADAT, [ASRIKA](#), Accessed 14.01.2025

¹¹⁷ Halk Tv, [SADAT'IN DÜŞÜNCE PROJESİ "ASRIKA"](#), 16.05.2022, Halk Tv, Accessed 27.02.2024

¹¹⁸ Sound of Silence, [SADAT: Erdoğan's Private Army](#), August 2017, [15julynotes.com](#), Accessed 02.12.2024

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

91. Meral Akşener, the former leader of the Good Party (İYİ Parti-İYİ), has stated that she has seen photographs of SADAT camps in Konya and Tokat.¹²⁰ She filed a criminal complaint regarding these camps, and expressed her concerns that these camps could be used to create chaos during elections.¹²¹ The camps were allegedly being used for training purposes and individuals in uniform carrying long-barreled weapons were seen.

Human Rights Violations

92. SADAT's role as a proxy and enabler for Türkiye has profound implications for international security and human rights. Its operations blur the lines between state and non-state actors, allowing Türkiye to pursue geopolitical ambitions covertly. However, the lack of transparency, allegations of human rights abuses, and involvement in illicit networks make SADAT a controversial entity.¹²²

93. As an extension of Türkiye's foreign policy, SADAT exemplifies the growing use of private military companies in contemporary conflicts, where accountability and adherence to international law remain significant challenges.

94. SADAT has faced significant international criticism for its role in human rights violations, including torture, extrajudicial killings, and the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers, particularly in Libya.

95. In Libya, SADAT's mercenaries were involved in looting, displacement, and other acts that exacerbated the suffering of civilians.

96. In Nagorno-Karabakh, reports highlight systematic violence against civilians by SADAT-backed fighters, further destabilizing the region.¹²³

97. SADAT's association with extremist groups has also raised concerns about its role in perpetuating cycles of violence and impunity in conflict zones¹²⁴. There are claims that SADAT was working with groups such as Al-Nusra and ISIS.¹²⁵

98. Amnesty International¹²⁶ evidence shows how part of the Syrian National Army, a coalition of Syrian armed groups equipped and supported by SADAT forces have displayed a shameful disregard for civilian life, including through summary killings and unlawful attacks that have killed and injured civilians. Amnesty gathered witness testimony between 12 and 16 October (2019) from 17 people, including medical and rescue workers, displaced civilians, journalists, and humanitarian workers, as well as analyzing and verifying video footage and reviewing medical reports and other documentation in Syria. It also reveals gruesome details of a summary killing in cold blood of a prominent Syrian-Kurdish politician, Hevrin Khalaf, by members of Ahrar Al-Sharqiya, part of the Syrian National Army, a coalition of Syrian armed groups equipped and supported by SADAT. The Kurdish-led administration's health authority in

¹²⁰ İsmail Saymaz, [Akşener: SADAT'ın kamp fotoğraflarını gördüm](#), 20.05.2022, Halk Tv, Accessed 19.01.2025

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Regan A. Metzger, [The Path of Least Resistance Using the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to Hold Türkiye Accountable for Abuses Perpetrated by SADAT Defense Consultancy, Vol 48 Reports, Fall2022](#), The University of North Carolina School of Law, Accessed 25.11.2024

¹²³ Armenian Bar Association, [Armenian Bar Association Files Global Magnitsky Sanctions Complaint Against Turkey's SADAT](#), 23.09.2024, Armenian Bar Association, Accessed 24.12.2024

¹²⁴ Liz Cookman, [Syrians Make Up Türkiye's Proxy Army in Nagorno-Karabakh](#), 05.10.2020, Foreign Policy, Accessed 15.07.2021

¹²⁵ Beşire Korkmaz, [Sadat hakkındaki iddiaların perde arkasında neler var?](#), 15.06.2021, Teyit, Accessed 16.09.2023

¹²⁶ Amnesty International UK Press releases, [Turkish forces commit war crimes in Syria offensive - fresh evidence](#), 18.10.2019, Amnesty International, Accessed 07.01.2025

northeast Syria said that at least 218 civilians - including 18 children - had been killed in Syria since the offensive began.¹²⁷

99. These practices have been condemned by organizations such as the United Nations, which highlighted SADAT's activities as a threat to the right to life, freedom from torture, and liberty.¹²⁸ Additionally, SADAT's involvement in arming and training militias with extremist affiliations has raised concerns about regional security and the proliferation of violent non-state actors.¹²⁹

Regional and Global Implications

100. SADAT's activities contribute to regional instability by fostering conflict, undermining state authority, and enabling the proliferation of armed non-state actors.

101. In Africa, SADAT's increasing presence has militarized regions like the Sahel, while its involvement in the Middle East has amplified tensions between competing factions. Comparisons to Russia's Wagner Group highlight SADAT's role as a disruptive force in global geopolitics.

102. The organization's facilitation of arms transfers and training for extremist groups poses a broader threat to international security. For instance, its reported supply of weapons to Al-Nusra and other groups undermines efforts to combat terrorism and maintain regional peace.¹³⁰

Legal and Ethical Concerns

103. SADAT's operations violate several international norms, including the United Nations Convention against Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries. However, accountability is hindered by the organization's use of plausible deniability and its close ties to Türkiye's government. Calls for stricter regulation of private military companies emphasize the need for oversight to prevent further violations.¹³¹

104. SADAT exemplifies how private military companies can serve as tools for state-sponsored covert operations while evading accountability. Its role in destabilizing conflict zones, violating human rights, and enabling geopolitical ambitions underscores the urgent need for comprehensive international mechanisms to regulate PMCs. By addressing SADAT's actions, the global community can work towards mitigating the harm caused by such organizations and safeguarding human rights in conflict-affected regions.

¹²⁷ Amnesty International UK Press releases, [Turkish forces commit war crimes in Syria offensive - fresh evidence](#), 18.10.2019, Amnesty International, Accessed 07.01.2025

¹²⁸ The Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination; the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; the Special Rapporteur on the sale and sexual exploitation of children, including child prostitution, child pornography and other child sexual abuse material and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, [The UN Joint Communication on the deployment of Syrian fighters to the armed conflict in Libya](#), 20.06.2020, Accessed 21.01.2025

¹²⁹ Liz Cookman, [Syrians Make Up Türkiye's Proxy Army in Nagorno-Karabakh](#), 05.10.2020, Foreign Policy, Accessed 15.07.2021

¹³⁰ EGE, [SADAT, outil d'influence islamique frériste dans une logique offensive turque](#), 29.01.2024, Ecole de Guerre Economique, Accessed 05.02.2024

¹³¹ Regan A. Metzger, [The Path of Least Resistance Using the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to Hold Türkiye Accountable for Abuses Perpetrated by SADAT Defense Consultancy, Vol 48 Reports, Fall2022](#), The University of North Carolina School of Law, Accessed 25.11.2024

Accountability and access to justice and remedy for victims

Mechanisms and Measures for Accountability Regarding SADAT's Activities

105. The investigation against SADAT faces numerous challenges in terms of allegations and prosecution, primarily due to legal loopholes, operational secrecy, and political protection. The company's activities often fall outside the traditional definition of "mercenary," which allows it to operate without being subject to the same regulations. International agreements governing PMCs are frequently non-binding, and many states lack specific domestic laws to regulate their activities effectively.¹³²

106. One significant impediment to holding states accountable is the difficulty in establishing a direct link between the actions of SADAT and the states that employ them¹³³, as SADAT's operations are often covert, making it difficult to obtain reliable information.

107. The company operates within complex networks involving multiple actors, further complicating efforts to pinpoint specific roles and responsibilities. Investigations in conflict zones are extremely challenging due to security risks, limited access, and the destruction of evidence. Access to witnesses and crime scenes is often restricted, and witnesses may be reluctant to come forward for fear of retaliation. Obtaining internal documents from SADAT or its affiliates is also difficult due to the secretive nature of their operations.

108. Political interference, a lack of cooperation from states that employ SADAT, and propaganda campaigns also hinder investigations. Additionally, investigations require significant resources, which many countries and international bodies lack.

109. The absence of an international consensus on the definition of mercenaries and the regulation of private military and security companies (PMSCs) allows entities like SADAT to operate in a grey area.¹³⁴ Türkiye is not a signatory to key international agreements aimed at regulating mercenaries, creating a legal loophole.¹³⁵

110. SADAT operates with a high degree of secrecy, often using front companies and local partners, making it challenging to trace the company's involvement in specific conflicts.¹³⁶

111. The company benefits from the backing of the Turkish state, which provides it with political cover, making it difficult to conduct independent investigations. SADAT's extremist ideology may resonate with some segments of society, creating challenges in establishing accountability within Türkiye and in countries where it operates.¹³⁷

112. The transnational nature of SADAT's operations makes it difficult to conduct effective investigations within any single jurisdiction. The use of SADAT as a proxy allows states to exercise influence in conflicts without direct involvement, thereby evading legal responsibility. The lack of effective mechanisms to hold states accountable for utilizing PMCs like SADAT in conflict zones perpetuates a cycle of impunity.

¹³² Regan A. Metzger, [*The Path of Least Resistance Using the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to Hold Türkiye Accountable for Abuses Perpetrated by SADAT Defense Consultancy*](#), Vol 48 Reports, Fall2022, The University of North Carolina School of Law, Accessed 25.11.2024

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ BBC Türkçe, [*Adnan Tanrıverdi hayatını kaybetti Kurucusu olduğu askeri şirket SADAT'ın anatomisi*](#), 04.08.2024, BBC Türkçe, Accessed 05.08.2024

¹³⁵ Matt Powers, [*Making Sense of SADAT, Türkiye's Private Military Company*](#), 08.10.2021, War on the Rocks, Accessed 23.10.2024

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Tyler Stapleton and Sinan Ciddi, [*Analysis: Erdoğan's private military company looks to raise an Islamist army*](#), 27.09.2024, FDD's Long War Journal, Accessed 04.02.2025

113. Despite these challenges, there have been some accountability measures pursued against SADAT and its affiliates, but no state or third-party entity has been definitively held legally accountable for engaging SADAT as proxies, enablers, and facilitators in actions that have resulted in human rights abuses and the impeding of self-determination and respect for constitutional order. The Armenian Bar Association has filed a formal [recommendation](#) to the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Treasury recommending sanctions against SADAT and its key officials under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.

Lack of Binding Legal Frameworks and Gaps in International Law

114. There are currently no effective mechanisms to hold states accountable for utilizing PMCs as proxies. International agreements and conventions may not adequately address the issues raised by PMCs such as SADAT, as these companies often fall outside the traditional definition of "mercenary"¹³⁸, creating a legal gap that allows them to operate with less oversight. The absence of a comprehensive international legal framework to regulate PMCs like SADAT limits the avenues for accountability.¹³⁹

UN Investigations and Reports

115. While some international bodies have raised concerns and launched investigations, these have not yet translated into concrete accountability. The UN Human Rights Council has repeatedly condemned the use of mercenaries and expressed concern about SADAT's involvement in the recruitment and deployment of Syrian mercenaries. UN experts have also specifically raised concerns about the use of mercenaries in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, calling for investigations and accountability.¹⁴⁰

116. In a [joint communication](#) with Reference: AL TUR 7/2020, dated 10 June 2020 on the use of mercenaries, it has been requested information from the Turkish government about SADAT's activities in Libya and Türkiye's large-scale recruitment and transfer of Syrian fighters. They also cited SADAT's involvement in the process. However, in the joint communication¹⁴¹ no state was not held responsible for engaging SADAT in actions that have led to human rights abuses.

U.S. Government Recognition

117. The US Department of Defense has reported on SADAT's role in Libya, but these reports have not resulted in any concrete actions against the Turkish government or other entities engaging

¹³⁸ Regan A. Metzger, [The Path of Least Resistance Using the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to Hold Türkiye Accountable for Abuses Perpetrated by SADAT Defense Consultancy, Vol 48 Reports, Fall2022](#), The University of North Carolina School of Law, Accessed 25.11.2024

¹³⁹ BBC Türkçe, [Adnan Tanrıverdi hayatını kaybetti Kurucusu olduğu askeri şirket SADAT'ın anatomisi](#), 04.08.2024, BBC Türkçe, Accessed 05.08.2024

¹⁴⁰ Armenian Bar Association, [Armenian Bar Association Files Global Magnitsky Sanctions Complaint Against Turkey's SADAT](#), 23.09.2024, Armenian Bar Association, Accessed 24.12.2024

¹⁴¹ The Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination; the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; the Special Rapporteur on the sale and sexual exploitation of children, including child prostitution, child pornography and other child sexual abuse material and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, [The UN Joint Communication on the deployment of Syrian fighters to the armed conflict in Libya](#), 20.06.2020, Accessed 21.01.2025

SADAT.¹⁴² The U.S. Congress and President Biden, who was the president at the time, have recognized the geopolitical significance of the use of mercenaries in the Armenia-Azerbaijan war of 2020.¹⁴³

Lack of Direct State Involvement

118. SADAT operates as a private entity, allowing states to maintain plausible deniability regarding its actions.¹⁴⁴ This makes it difficult to prove direct state responsibility for SADAT's activities and any resulting human rights abuses.¹⁴⁵

Political Protection and Türkiye's Denials

119. SADAT enjoys a close relationship with the Turkish government, which provides it with political protection and shields it from legal scrutiny.¹⁴⁶ The Turkish government has denied claims of deploying mercenaries to Libya, Niger, or Nagorno-Karabakh.¹⁴⁷ SADAT itself has also denied recruiting and deploying mercenaries, claiming to only provide "consultancy, training, and logistics services"¹⁴⁸.

Focus on Individual Actors and Reluctance of Witnesses

120. Many efforts have focused on sanctioning individuals within SADAT rather than holding the state actors who contracted with SADAT responsible.¹⁴⁹ There are reports that individuals involved in mercenary activities linked to SADAT have been criminally convicted in Armenia, but these convictions are of individual mercenaries and do not address the liability of the states that engaged SADAT as a proxy. Fear of reprisal from SADAT or its affiliated groups discourages witnesses from coming forward with information.

Complex Chains of Command and Evidentiary Difficulties

121. The complex operational structure and involvement of numerous actors make it extremely difficult to pinpoint which individuals or entities are culpable for specific violations. Gathering sufficient evidence to hold states or third-party entities accountable is a significant challenge. SADAT's operations are often conducted in conflict zones with limited access for independent investigators, and the company's use of front companies makes it hard to trace their activities.¹⁵⁰

122. SADAT's actions are controversial, with accusations of human rights violations, including the recruitment of child soldiers, and the deployment of mercenaries in violation of international law. Mercenaries deployed by SADAT are often involved in serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, sexual assault, and the recruitment of child soldiers.¹⁵¹

¹⁴² Matt Powers, [Making Sense of SADAT, Türkiye's Private Military Company](#), 08.10.2021, War on the Rocks, Accessed 23.10.2024

¹⁴³ Armenian Bar Association, [Armenian Bar Association Files Global Magnitsky Sanctions Complaint Against Turkey's SADAT](#), 23.09.2024, Armenian Bar Association, Accessed 24.12.2024

¹⁴⁴ SWJ Staff, [Alternative Ways to Seek Regional and Global Influence-How Shadowy Organizations Serve the Interests of Türkiye, Iran, and Russia](#), 04.08.2022, Small Wars Journal, Accessed 09.09.2022

¹⁴⁵ Matt Powers, [Making Sense of SADAT, Türkiye's Private Military Company](#), 08.10.2021, War on the Rocks, Accessed 23.10.2024

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Hadia Al Mansour, [Soldiers of misfortune: How Syrian mercenaries ended up in Niger](#), 15.01. 2025, Last Update 21.01.2025 The New Arab, Accessed 25.01.2025

¹⁴⁸ ADF, [Turkish PMC 'Sadat' Competes for Sahel Influence](#), 30.07.2024, ADF, Accessed 03.08.2024

¹⁴⁹ Armenian Bar Association, [Armenian Bar Association Files Global Magnitsky Sanctions Complaint Against Turkey's SADAT](#), 23.09.2024, Armenian Bar Association, Accessed 24.12.2024

¹⁵⁰ Matt Powers, [Making Sense of SADAT, Türkiye's Private Military Company](#), 08.10.2021, War on the Rocks, Accessed 23.10.2024

123. Despite numerous reports, sanctions, and investigations linking SADAT to human rights abuses, no state or third-party entity has been definitively held legally accountable for engaging SADAT as a proxy, which has led to human rights abuses and the impeding of self-determination. The challenges of attribution, the lack of binding legal frameworks, political protection, operational opacity, and evidentiary challenges continue to impede any efforts toward accountability.

V. Conclusion

124. To conclude, SADAT and its affiliates-mercenaries operate with in close ideological alignment with Erdoğan's political pragmatism, religious extremism, and charismatic authority¹⁵², acting as a proxy and enabler tool for Turkish foreign policy.^{153 154}

125. As presented as a PMC established by direct order from Erdoğan¹⁵⁵, SADAT's actions naturally align with and promote Erdoğan's agenda. The organization engages in controversial activities, including alleged human rights violations and involvement in illicit networks.¹⁵⁶

126. The international community has criticized SADAT and its affiliates-mercenaries for its human rights abuses, lack of transparency, and contribution to regional instability.^{157 158}

127. In addition to its operations in various conflict zones around the world, SADAT's and its affiliates-mercenaries' roles in the so-called coup attempt on July 15, 2016, along with its proposed new union¹⁵⁹ intended to operate beyond the "control of Western imperialism"¹⁶⁰ and grounded in religious principles, ASRIKA project, illustrates the organization's potentially negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights, compliance with national laws, and adherence to relevant international humanitarian and human rights obligations, as well as the security and stability of the region and the world.

128. The examples of SADAT's and its affiliates' crimes detailed above are only a few examples of the systematic abuse that took place. There are strong evidences of SADAT and its affiliates-mercenaries-related activities of systematic violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law, and crimes against humanity, including negative impacts on respect for and integrity of constitutional orders in Türkiye following the events of July 15, 2016, and across the globe. However,

¹⁵¹ Armenian Bar Association, [Armenian Bar Association Files Global Magnitsky Sanctions Complaint Against Turkey's SADAT](#), 23.09.2024, Armenian Bar Association, Accessed 24.12.2024

¹⁵² Giorgi Koberidze, [Erdoğan and the Emergence of Erdoğanism in Turkish Politics](#), 25.11.2024, JPD Troy University, Accessed 23.01.2025

¹⁵³ Michael Rubin, [Has SADAT Become Erdogan's Revolutionary Guards?](#), 30.05.2017, American Enterprise Institute, Accessed 01.01.2025

¹⁵⁴ General supervision: Mazen Darwish, Lead researcher: Dr. Aiman Menem, Reviewed by: Yara Badr, [Shadow armies \(2\)Report](#), 2024, The Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, Accessed 21.01.2025

¹⁵⁵ David Gaüzère, [Malhama Tactical et SADAT : Le Mercenariat Au Service de L'Islam Politique](#), January 2022, Cf2R Bulletin De Documentation N°26, Accessed 12.06.2023

¹⁵⁶ ADF, [Turkish PMC 'Sadat' Competes for Sahel Influence](#), 30.07.2024, ADF, Accessed 03.08.2024

¹⁵⁷ Matt Powers, [Making Sense of SADAT, Türkiye's Private Military Company](#), 08.10.2021, War on the Rocks, Accessed 23.10.2024

¹⁵⁸ Tyler Stapleton and Sinan Ciddi, [Analysis: Erdogan's private military company looks to raise an Islamist army](#), 27.09.2024, FDD's Long War Journal, Accessed 04.02.2025

¹⁵⁹ ODA Tv, [SADAT'in seçim planı](#), 19.11.2023, ODA Tv, Accessed 05.01.2024

¹⁶⁰ Dmitri Amirov Belova, [Turquía, las PMC islamistas y la Zona gris](#), 12.02.2023, Revistaejercitos, Accessed 23.04.2024

accountability has been challenging due to legal loopholes, political protection, and operational opacity.^{161 162 163 164}

129. In response to these atrocities;

- a. The absence of effective mechanisms to hold states accountable for utilizing PMCs like SADAT as proxies perpetuates a cycle of impunity. Despite numerous reports and investigations, no state or third-party entity has been definitively held legally accountable for engaging SADAT.
- b. National and international inspections, the inadequate response consisted only of statistical figures, glossing over vital issues. Although these crimes were reported in the press with pictures and images, no investigation was carried out into these incidents, and those who committed these acts were not held accountable.

130. Taking the information given above and the human rights violations conducted by SADAT and its affiliated mercenaries into consideration Rights Defenders Initiative (RDI) respectfully requests that this Working Group should consider passing these recommendations to the Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly

- a. to condemn SADAT and Türkiye, in the strongest possible terms, for the violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, including impacts on respect for and integrity of constitutional orders across the globe and their atrocities during so-called coup attempt on 15 July 2016 as well.
- b. to urge Türkiye
 - to ensure the creation and implementation of an independent mechanism to investigate complaints against criminal conduct by SADAT and its affiliates-mercenaries and mercenary-related activities,
 - to ensure that all cases of human right abuses and other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment are properly investigated and prosecuted,
 - to ensure the protection of victims and witnesses who report crimes. and guarantee to publish comprehensive data on crime investigations and their outcomes,
 - to intensify its efforts to ensure that SADAT and its affiliates-mercenaries in State territories operate under contractual obligations,
 - to monitor and control SADAT and its affiliates-mercenaries' activities that comply with national laws, and relevant international humanitarian and human rights obligations,
 - to withdraw any SADAT originated mercenaries and related actors immediately and not to engage in further recruitment, funding, and deployment,
 - to eradicate all forms of inhuman and degrading treatment carried out by SADAT and its affiliates-mercenaries, including through prompt and independent investigations, the

¹⁶¹ Matt Powers, [Making Sense of SADAT, Türkiye's Private Military Company](#), 08.10.2021, War on the Rocks, Accessed 23.10.2024

¹⁶² Tyler Stapleton and Sinan Ciddi, [Analysis: Erdogan's private military company looks to raise an Islamist army](#), 27.09.2024, FDD's Long War Journal, Accessed 04.02.2025

¹⁶³ Regan A. Metzger, [The Path of Least Resistance Using the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to Hold Türkiye Accountable for Abuses Perpetrated by SADAT Defense Consultancy, Vol 48 Reports, Fall2022](#), The University of North Carolina School of Law, Accessed 25.11.2024

¹⁶⁴ SWJ Staff, [Alternative Ways to Seek Regional and Global Influence-How Shadowy Organizations Serve the Interests of Türkiye, Iran, and Russia](#), 04.08.2022, SmallASRIKAJournal, Accessed 09.09.2022

prosecution of perpetrators and the adoption of provisions for effective protection and remedies to the victims,

- to ensure that victims of such acts receive adequate reparation and compensation. It should take all necessary measures to i) Establish comprehensive rehabilitation programs for victims. ii) Ensure fair and adequate compensation for victims of crimes. iii) Remove any obstacles to victims seeking redress through the legal system.
- to intensify its efforts to i) Extend an open invitation to UN Special Procedures, ii) Fully cooperate with international human rights mechanisms and implement their recommendations. iii) Share best practices and challenges in combating SADAT and its affiliates-mercenaries and mercenary-related crimes in all their forms and manifestations with the international community.